I'm attempting to use rssh to jail users strictly to their /home/user/public_html dirctories. I got it to work where an account can SFTP into the system successfully on a test server, but once I login as that account, I noticed that I can change directories to anywhere I wish and view the contents of files. I may not be able to edit or transfer to those directories, but I thought the whole purpose of being able to jail them was to prevent such a thing?
SSHD is set up with Subsystem sftp internal-sftp RSSH has the user designated as only able to use scp and sftp The user's account is using /usr/bin/rssh for the shell and /home/user/public_html User's home directory is root:user owner:group
I have noticed though that the only files that they can view the contents of and directories that they can cd into are all world readable, which makes sense, but why are they allowed to leave they're directory at all? And please don't say that I just answered my own question. The purpose is to find the best-practice solution for preventing this.
The desired outcome is that they are restricted any ability to cd to any directory not owned by them.
Am I missing something here?
Here's the contents of the rssh.conf file;
logfacility = LOG_USER allowscp allowsftp #allowcvs #allowrdist #allowrsync #allowsvnserve # set the default umask umask = 022 user=wwwtest1:077:110000:/home/wwwtest1/public_html
And here's the contents of the sshd_config file;
# Package generated configuration file # See the sshd_config(5) manpage for details # What ports, IPs and protocols we listen for Port 22 # Use these options to restrict which interfaces/protocols sshd will bind to #ListenAddress :: #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 Protocol 2 # HostKeys for protocol version 2 HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key #Privilege Separation is turned on for security UsePrivilegeSeparation yes # Lifetime and size of ephemeral version 1 server key KeyRegenerationInterval 3600 ServerKeyBits 768 # Logging SyslogFacility AUTH LogLevel INFO # Authentication: LoginGraceTime 120 PermitRootLogin yes StrictModes yes RSAAuthentication yes PubkeyAuthentication yes #AuthorizedKeysFile %h/.ssh/authorized_keys # Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files IgnoreRhosts yes # For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh_known_hosts RhostsRSAAuthentication no # similar for protocol version 2 HostbasedAuthentication no # Uncomment if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for RhostsRSAAuthentication #IgnoreUserKnownHosts yes # To enable empty passwords, change to yes (NOT RECOMMENDED) PermitEmptyPasswords no # Change to yes to enable challenge-response passwords (beware issues with # some PAM modules and threads) ChallengeResponseAuthentication no # Change to no to disable tunnelled clear text passwords #PasswordAuthentication yes # Kerberos options #KerberosAuthentication no #KerberosGetAFSToken no #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes #KerberosTicketCleanup yes # GSSAPI options #GSSAPIAuthentication no #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes X11Forwarding yes X11DisplayOffset 10 PrintMotd no PrintLastLog yes TCPKeepAlive yes #UseLogin no #MaxStartups 10:30:60 #Banner /etc/issue.net # Allow client to pass locale environment variables AcceptEnv LANG LC_* #Subsystem sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server Subsystem sftp internal-sftp # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will # be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and # PasswordAuthentication. Depending on your PAM configuration, # PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass # the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password". # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'. UsePAM yes