After searching for several years, I recently created a tool for synchronising LVM snapshots between servers. It is designed to use minimal IO and allow the systems to run while the synchronsation is happening.
It is similar to ZFS send / receive in that in synchronises the differences between LVM snapshots, and uses thin provisioning so that performance ...
With the Linux Integration Services kernel modules, available from Ubuntu, you can take online file system consistent snapshots. It does not use VSS, I am unsure as to whether that integration checkbox should be on or off for Linux.
Follow LIS install instructions from Microsoft, notably apt-get install linux-azure and reboot into this kernel.
To get ...
Here is an opensvc service running a kvm node named mywin, and it replicate (zfs send|zfs receive) every hour the zfs dataset data/mywin from primary node srv1 to zfs dataset data/mywin on secondary node srv2 :
root@srv1:~# om mywin print config
env = PRD
nodes = srv1.acme.com srv2.acme.com
id = cd6e0bfa-4096-4249-899a-c8cd90a8979b
Also I have no benefit from the other advantages of volumes, anyway. Or am I missing something? Are there any disadavantages using a bind mount?
I seem to understand that Docker wants you to forget a host even exists; and in fact, sometimes you won't have access to it, so volumes are the most obvious way to persist data.
The bind mount is a path on the ...
Easy way: simply use syncoid and call the job done
Harder/longer way: you need to tap into incremental zfs send / recv. As it has multiple modes of operation, I do not think it can covered extensively in a concise answer. Let be said you need a first, full zfs send | zfs recv, followed by regular incremental ones. I would point you to Oracle docs for more ...
Not sure what Milen is on about since there is no grant statement for views and granting SELECT on tables is going to be enough.
Here are some SQL statements to get it done:
CREATE USER db_backup WITH PASSWORD 'p@55wurd_h3r3' LOGIN;
GRANT CONNECT ON DATABASE "some_db_name_here" to db_backup;
GRANT SELECT ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public TO db_backup;
https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/solutions/architecture/backup-archive-on-premises-applications/ shows the options at a high level. Azure Backup, or some other solution backed by blob storage.
Currently Azure backup pricing is per instance + storage in any scenario.
Backing up a file share of all your virtual disks is not what this is designed for, I ...
Are you asking if you can drop the Azure backups of the virtual machines and the databases?
If so, the answer is yes. Companies have been backing up virtual machines and databases locally since well before Azure had the capability to back them up to the cloud.
You'll need your own local storage for storing the backups and you'll need to configure the ...
Backup all of /etc/, and any config you know is elsewhere. Optionally, if you don't have a good installed package list, your rpm database in /var/lib/rpm/. Consider incremental backups of these directories, although fulls don't take up that much space.
To find what rpm thinks are config files, run rpm -qac. There is some non /etc/ strangeness in here that ...
Azure Backup Recovery Services Vault is a different entity than a storage account. It is not Blob and does not have hot/cool/archive tiers. Restores to your choice of storage account are documented.
As of June 2019, Azure Backup can backup VM disks and Azure File shares. To backup Azure Blob, use a different solution.
Instead of vault, it is possible to ...
Borg backup through SSH with key authentication. Problem: connection to that offsite server can be done with the key that's store on the host if the malicious user has root access to the host.
You can use option command in your authorized_keys. You fix the command allowed in remote.
how to add commands in ssh authorized_keys
Even if an attacker recovers ...
A technique you could set up is using syncthing between your server and a remote backup server, and letting the remote backup server do snapshots or whatever on its end so that erasure server side doesn't result in erasure offsite.
Solutions that aren't really interesting in my situation:
An extra backup job on the offsite host which transfers them to a location that isn't accessible by the first host.
The fundamental problem is that if you can remotely access your backups then so can the hacker.
(Due to technical limitation)
Technical limitations are made to be overcome.
You can use storage services like AWS S3 (or probably Google's or Azure's equivalent) where you can give your root account PUT permissions to your bucket but not DELETE permissions. That way, you can use a push model and the attacker won't be able to delete the backup.
There are further security measures that you can take with AWS, like requiring MFA to ...
One good option is to make your backup storage immutable, or at least provide reliable versioning which gives you effectively immutability. To be clear: immutable means unable to be changed, or permanent.
There are multiple services that can do this for you. AWS S3, BackBlaze B2, and I suspect Azure and Google both offer a similar service....
All your suggestions currently have one thing in common: the backup source does the backup and has access to the backup destination. Whether you mount the location or use tools like SSH or rsync, the source system somehow has access to the backup. Therefore, a compromise on the server might compromise your backups, too.
What if the backup solution has ...